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In this paper we review Castagnino’s contributions to the foundations of quantum
mechanics. First, we recall his work on quantum decoherence in closed systems, and
the proposal of a general framework for decoherence from which the phenomenon
acquires a conceptually clear meaning. Then, we introduce his contribution to the
hard field of the interpretation of quantum mechanics: the modal-Hamiltonian in-
terpretation solves many of the interpretive problems of the theory, and manifests
its physical relevance in its application to many traditional models of the practice
of physics. In the third part of this work we describe the ontological picture of the
quantum world that emerges from the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, stressing
the philosophical step toward a deep understanding of the reference of the theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anybody who has been close to Prof. Mario Castagnino, even for a short time, knows
that he is an ever-eager spirit: the many different subjects treated in this issue are a clear
manifestation of the wide panoply of interests that have moved him during his long academic
life. Nevertheless, the present article has a peculiarity with respect to the rest of the papers
of the issue: Castagnino should be one of the authors of this work. In fact, since ten years ago
he has been actively engaged with the foundations and the philosophy of physics, leading an
always increasing research group to which we belong. In this field we have obtained relevant
results with a remarkable repercussion.
As Castagnino uses to say, he is a senior physicist but a baby philosopher. However, this
fact was not an obstacle to his eager spirit, which has been involved in the foundations of
so many different subjects that cannot be addressed in a single article. In the present paper
we will confine our attention to Castagnino’s contributions to the foundations of quantum
2mechanics (QM), in order to review his main results in this area. First, we will recall his
work on quantum decoherence in closed systems, and the proposal of a general framework
for decoherence from which the phenomenon acquires a conceptually clear meaning. Then,
we will introduce his contribution to the hard field of the interpretation of QM: our modal-
Hamiltonian interpretation solves many of the interpretive problems of the theory, and
manifests its physical relevance in its application to many traditional models used in the
practice of physics. In the third part of this work we will describe the ontological picture of
the quantum world that emerges from our interpretation; here we will stress our philosophical
step toward a deep understanding of the reference of the theory, a move not usual in the
contemporary discussions about the interpretation of QM. Finally, we will briefly recall
Castagnino’s contributions in other areas of the foundations and the philosophy of physics.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM DECOHERENCE
More than a decade ago Castagnino developed, with Roberto Laura, a formalism that
explains the limit reached by expectation values in closed quantum systems with continuous
spectrum,[1]−[6] and begun to conceive that formalism in terms of decoherence. When,
some years later, those works were reanalyzed in the context of our research group, we
acknowledged the conceptual relevance and the fruitful perspectives of that work. So, the
original proposal was further elaborated from a conceptual viewpoint, and presented in
several meetings and papers.[7]−[16] In particular, we were invited by Prof. Fred Kronz,
from the University of Texas at Austin, to discuss that new view, and he suggested the
name ‘self-induced decoherence’ (SID) in contrast with the orthodox ‘environment-induced
decoherence’ (EID) approach.[17],[18]
In those first works, we presented SID as different from EID, that is, as the way in which
decoherence manifests itself in closed systems. However, shortly after we realized that
both approaches can be subsumed under a General Theoretical Framework for Decoherence
(GTFD), which encompasses decoherence in open and closed systems.[19]−[21] According
to this framework, decoherence is just a particular case of the general phenomenon of irre-
versibility in QM.[22],[23] Since the quantum state ρ(t) follows a unitary evolution, it cannot
reach a final equilibrium state for t → ∞. Therefore, if we want to explain the emergence
of non-unitary irreversible evolutions, we must split the whole space O of all possible ob-
3servables into a relevant subspace OR ⊂ O and an irrelevant subspace. With this strategy
we restrict the maximal information about the system: the expectation values 〈OR〉ρ(t) of
the observables OR ∈ OR express that relevant information. Of course, the decision about
which observables are to be considered as relevant depends on the particular purposes in
each situation; but without this restriction, irreversible evolutions cannot be described. In
fact, the different approaches to decoherence always select a set OR of relevant observables
in terms of which the time behavior of the system is described: gross observables in van
Kampen,[24] macroscopic observables of the apparatus in Daneri et al.,[25] observables of
the open system in EID,[26]−[18] relevant observables in Omne´s.[29],[30]
Once the essential role played by the selection of the relevant observables is clearly un-
derstood, decoherence can be explained in three general steps:
1. First step: The set OR of relevant observables is defined.
2. Second step: The expectation value 〈OR〉ρ(t), for any OR ∈ OR, is obtained. This
step can be formulated in two different but equivalent ways:
• 〈OR〉ρ(t) is computed as the expectation value of OR in the unitarily evolving state
ρ(t).
• A coarse-grained state ρG(t) is defined by 〈OR〉ρ(t) = 〈OR〉ρG(t) for any OR ∈ OR,
and its non-unitary evolution (governed by a master equation) is computed.
3. Third step: It is proved that 〈OR〉ρ(t) = 〈OR〉ρG(t) reaches a final equilibrium value
〈OR〉ρ
∗
:
lim
t→∞
〈OR〉ρ(t) = lim
t→∞
〈OR〉ρG(t) = 〈OR〉ρ∗ (1)
where the final equilibrium state ρ∗ is obviously diagonal in its own eigenbasis, which
turns out to be the final pointer basis. But the unitarily evolving quantum state ρ(t)
of the whole system has only a weak limit :
W − lim
t→∞
ρ(t) = ρ∗ (2)
This weak limit means that, although the off-diagonal terms of ρ(t) never vanish
through the unitary evolution, the system decoheres from an observational point of
view, that is, from the viewpoint given by any relevant observable OR ∈ OR.
4This GTFD allows us to face the conceptual challenges that the EID approach still has
to face. One of them comes from the fact that, since the environment may be “external”
or “internal”, the EID approach offers no general criterion to decide where to place the
“cut” between system and environment. Zurek considers this fact as a shortcoming of his
proposal: “In particular, one issue which has been often taken for granted is looming big, as
a foundation of the whole decoherence program. It is the question of what are the ‘systems’
which play such a crucial role in all the discussions of the emergent classicality.”[31] In order
to address this problem, the first step is to realize that the EID relevant observables of the
closed system U are those corresponding to the open system S:
OR = OS ⊗ IE ∈ OR ⊂ O (3)
where OS ∈ OS of S and IE is the identity operator in OE of E. The reduced density
operator ρS(t) of S is defined by tracing over the environmental degrees of freedom,
ρS(t) = TrE ρ(t) (4)
The EID approach studies the time-evolution of ρS(t) governed by an effective master equa-
tion; it proves that, under certain definite conditions, ρS(t) converges to a stable state ρS∗:
ρS(t) −→ ρS∗. But we also know that the expectation value of any OR ∈ OR in the state
ρ(t) of U can be computed as
〈OR〉ρ(t) = Tr (ρ(t)(OS ⊗ IE)) = Tr (ρS(t)OS) = 〈OS〉ρS(t) (5)
Therefore, the convergence of ρS(t) to ρS∗ implies the convergence of the expectation values:
〈OR〉ρ(t) = 〈OS〉ρS(t) −→ 〈OS〉ρS∗ = 〈OR〉ρ∗ (6)
where ρ∗ is a final diagonal state of U , such that ρS∗ = TrE ρ∗.
¿From this new conceptual perspective, we have studied the well-known spin-bath model:
a closed system U = P ∪ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ PN = P ∪ (∪
N
i=1Pi), where (i) P is a spin-1/2 particle
represented in the Hilbert space HP , and (ii) each Pi is a spin-1/2 particle represented in
its Hilbert space Hi. The Hilbert space of the composite system U is, then,
H = HP ⊗
(
N⊗
i=1
Hi
)
(7)
5If the self-Hamiltonians HP of P and Hi of Pi are taken to be zero, and there is no inter-
action among the Pi, then the total Hamiltonian H of the composite system U is given by
the interaction between the particle P and each particle Pi.[32] By contrast to the usual
presentations, we have studied different decompositions of the whole closed system U into
a relevant part and its environment.[33]
a. Decomposition 1: A large environment that produces decoherence. In the typical sit-
uation studied by the EID approach, the open system S is the particle P , and the remaining
particles Pi play the role of the environment E: S = P and E = ∪
N
i=1Pi. This decomposition
results in the system decoherence when the number of particles in the bath is very large.
b. Decomposition 2: A large environment with no decoherence We can conceive differ-
ent ways of splitting the whole closed system U . For instance, we can decide to observe
a particular particle Pj of what was previously considered the environment, and to con-
sider the remaining particles as the new environment, in such a way that S = Pj and
E = P ∪ (∪Ni=1,i 6=jPi). This decomposition results in that the system does not decohere.
c. Decomposition 3: A small environment that produces decoherence It may be the case
that the measuring arrangement “observes” a subset of the particles of the environment, e.g.,
the p first particles Pj. In this case, the system of interest is composed by p particles, S =
∪pi=1Pi, and the environment is composed by all the remaining particles, E = P ∪(∪
N
i=p+1Pi).
This decomposition results in the system decoherence when the number p is very large.
We have also studied a generalization of the spin-bath model, where a whole closed system
was split into an open many-spin system and its environment.[34] In this case we studied
different partitions of the whole system and identified those for which the selected system
does not decohere. As stressed in that work, this might help us to define clusters of particles
that can be used to store q-bits.
The results obtained in both cases allowed us to argue that Zurek’s “looming big” problem
is actually a pseudo-problem, which is simply dissolved by the fact that the split of a closed
quantum system into an open subsystem and its environment is just a way of selecting a
particular space of relevant observables of the whole closed system. But since there are many
different spaces of relevant observables depending on the observational viewpoint adopted,
the same closed system can be decomposed in many different ways: each decomposition rep-
resents a decision about which degrees of freedom are relevant and which can be disregarded
6in each case. And since there is no privileged or “essential” decomposition, there is no need
of an unequivocal criterion for deciding where to place the cut between “the” open system
and “the” environment. Summing up, decoherence is a phenomenon relative to the relevant
observables selected in each particular case. The only essential physical fact is that, among
all the observational viewpoints that may be adopted to study a quantum system, some of
them determine subspaces of relevant observables for which the system decoheres.
Another conceptual difficulty of the EID approach relies on its definition of the pointer
basis. This basis is clearly characterized in measurements situations, where the self-
Hamiltonian of the system can be neglected and the evolution is completely dominated
by the interaction Hamiltonian. In those cases, the pointer basis is given by the eigenstates
of the interaction Hamiltonian.[35] However, there are two further regimes, differing in the
relative strength of the system’s self-Hamiltonian and the interaction Hamiltonian, where
the pointer basis lacks a general definition.[36] Our present research is directed to the search
of a general and precise definition of the pointer basis of decoherence.
III. MODAL-HAMILTONIAN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Our work on decoherence from a closed-system perspective taught us that the decompo-
sition of the total Hamiltonian has to be studied in detail in each case, in order to know
whether the system of interest resulting from the partition decoheres or not under the action
of its self-Hamiltonian and the interaction Hamiltonian. Once we acknowledged the central
role played by the Hamiltonian in decoherence, the natural further step was to ask ourselves
whether it plays the same central role in interpretation. This question led us to formulate
our modal-Hamitonian interpretation (MHI) of QM,[37]−[39] which belongs to the modal
family:[40] it is a realist, non-collapse interpretation, according to which the quantum state
describes the possible properties of a system but not its actual properties. Here we will only
recall its main interpretative postulates.
The first step is to identify the systems that populate the quantum world. By adopting
an algebraic perspective, a quantum system is defined as:
Systems postulate (SP): A quantum system S is represented by a pair (O, H) such
that (i) O is a space of self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space H, representing the ob-
7servables of the system, (ii) H ∈ O is the time-independent Hamiltonian of the system S,
and (iii) if ρ0 ∈ O
′ (where O′ is the dual space of O) is the initial state of S, it evolves
according to the Schro¨dinger equation in its von Neumann version.
Of course, any quantum system can be partitioned in many ways; however, not any
partition will lead to parts which are, in turn, quantum systems.[41],[42] On this basis, a
composite system is defined as:
Composite systems postulate (CSP): A quantum system represented by S : (O , H),
with initial state ρ0 ∈ O
′, is composite when it can be partitioned into two quantum systems
S1 : (O1, H1) and S2 : (O2 , H2) such that (i) O = O1⊗O2, and (ii) H = H1⊗I2+I1⊗H2,
(where I1 and I2 are the identity operators in the corresponding tensor product spaces). In
this case, the initial states of S1 and S2 are obtained as the partial traces ρ10 = Tr(2)ρ0 and
ρ20 = Tr(1)ρ0; we say that S
1 and S2 are subsystems of the composite system, S = S1 ∪ S2.
If the system is not composite, it is elemental.
Since the contextuality of QM, as implied by the Kochen-Specker theorem,[43] prevents
us from consistently assigning actual values to all the observables of a quantum system in a
given state, the second step is to identify the preferred context, that is, the set of the actual-
valued observables of the system. Whereas the different rules of actual-value ascription
proposed by previous modal interpretations rely on mathematical properties of the theory,
our MHI places an element with a clear physical meaning, the Hamiltonian, at the heart of
its rule:
Actualization rule (AR): Given an elemental quantum system represented by S :
(O , H), the actual-valued observables of S are H and all the observables commuting with
H and having, at least, the same symmetries as H.
This preferred context where actualization occurs is independent of time: the actual-
valued observables always commute with the Hamiltonian and, therefore, they are constants
of motion of the system. In other words, the observables that receive actual values are the
same during all the “life” of the quantum system as such −precisely, as a closed system−:
there is no need of accounting for the dynamics of the actual properties of the quantum
system as in other modal interpretations.[44]
The fact that the Hamiltonian always belongs to the preferred context agrees with
the many physical cases where the energy has definite value. The MHI has been ap-
plied to several well-known physical situations (hydrogen atom, Zeeman effect, fine struc-
8ture, etc.), leading to results consistent with experimental evidence.[37] Moreover, it has
proved to be effective for solving the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-
ideal versions,[37] solving the deep challenges that non-ideal measurements pose to other
modal interpretations.[45],[46] In particular, the MHI distinguishes between reliable and
non-reliable non-ideal measurements.[37] Furthermore, in spite of the fact that MHI applies
to closed systems, we have proved its compatibility with EID.[47],[48]
Once the MHI was clearly formulated, our further question was whether it satisfies the
Galilean invariance of the theory. In fact, any continuous transformation admits two in-
terpretations. Under the active interpretation, the transformation corresponds to a change
from one system to another −transformed− system; under the passive interpretation, the
transformation consists in a change of the viewpoint −reference frame− from which the
system is described.[49] Nevertheless, in both cases the validity of a group of symmetry
transformations expresses the fact that the identity and the behavior of the system are not
altered by the application of the transformations: in the active interpretation language, the
original and the transformed systems are equivalent; in the passive interpretation language,
the original and the transformed reference frames are equivalent. Then, any realist inter-
pretation should agree with that physical fact: the rule of actual-value ascription should
select a set of actual-valued observables that remains unaltered under the transformations.
Since the Casimir operators of the central-extended Galilei group are invariant under all
the transformations of the group, one can reasonably expect that those Casimir operators
belong to the preferred context.
As we have seen, the preferred context selected by AR only depends on the Hamiltonian
of the system. Then, the requirement of invariance of the preferred context under the Galilei
transformations is directly fulfilled when the Hamiltonian is invariant, that is, in the case of
time-displacement, space-displacement and space-rotation:
H ′ = eiHτH e−iHτ = H (since [H,H ] = 0) (8)
H ′ = eiPiriH e−iPiri = H (since [Pi, H ] = 0) (9)
H ′ = eiJiθiH e−iJiθi = H (since [Ji, H ] = 0) (10)
However, it is not clear that the requirement completely holds, since the Hamiltonian is not
invariant under Galilei-boosts. In fact, under a Galilei-boost corresponding to a velocity ux,
9H changes as
H ′ = eiK
(G)
x uxH e−iK
(G)
x ux 6= H (since
[
K(G)x , H
]
= iPx 6= 0) (11)
Nevertheless, when space is homogeneous and isotropic, a Galilei-boost only introduces a
change in the subsystem that carries the kinetic energy of translation: the internal energyW
remains unaltered under the transformation. This should not sound surprising to the extent
that W −multiplied by the scalar mass m− is a Casimir operator of the central-extended
Galilei group. On this basis, we can reformulate AR in an explicit Galilei-invariant form in
terms of the Casimir operators of the central-extended group:
Actualization rule’ (AR’): Given a quantum system free from external fields and rep-
resented by S : (O , H), its actual-valued observables are the observables CGi represented by
the Casimir operators of the central-extended Galilei group in the corresponding irreducible
representation, and all the observables commuting with the CGi and having, at least, the same
symmetries as the CGi .
Since the observables CGi −in the reference frame of the center of mass− are M , mW
and m2S2, this new version AR’ is in agreement with the original AR when applied to a
system free from external fields:[50]−[52]
• The actual-valuedness ofM and S2, postulated by AR’, follows from AR: these observ-
ables commute with H and do not break its symmetries because, in non-relativistic
QM, both are multiples of the identity in any irreducible representation.
• The actual-valuedness ofW might seem to be in conflict with AR becauseW is not the
Hamiltonian: whereas W is Galilei-invariant, H changes under the action of a Galilei-
boost. However, this is not a real obstacle because a Galilei-boost transformation only
introduces a change in the subsystem that carries the kinetic energy of translation,
which can be considered a mere shift in an energy defined up to a constant.[50],[52]
Summing up, the application of AR’ leads to reasonable results, since the actual-valued
observables turn out to be invariant and, therefore, objective magnitudes. The assumption
of a strong link between invariance and objectivity is rooted in a natural idea: what is
objective should not depend on the particular perspective used for the description; or, in
group-theoretical terms, what is objective according to a theory is what is invariant under
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the symmetry group of the theory. This idea is not new: it was widely discussed in the
context of special and general relativity with respect to the ontological status of space and
time,[53] and since then it reappeared in several works. [54]−[59] ¿From this perspective,
AR says that the observables that acquire actual values are those representing objective
magnitudes. On the other hand, from any realist viewpoint, the fact that certain observables
acquire an actual value is an objective fact in the behavior of the system; therefore, the set of
actual-valued observables selected by a realist interpretation must be also Galilean-invariant.
But the Galilean-invariant observables are always functions of the Casimir operators of the
Galilean group. As a consequence, one is led to the conclusion that any realist interpretation
that intends to preserve the objectivity of actualization may not stand very far from the
modal-Hamiltonian interpretation.
When AR is expressed in simple group terms, one can expect that it can be extrapolated
to any quantum theory endowed with a symmetry group. In particular, the actual-valued
observables of a system in quantum field theory would be those represented by the Casimir
operators of the Poincare´ group and of the internal symmetry group. On this basis, in a
recent paper we presented an alternative version of the non-relativistic limit of the centrally
extended Poincare´ group and its consequences for interpretive problems.[60]
As it is well known, the Galilei group can be recovered from the Poincare´ group by means
of Ino¨nu¨-Wigner contraction.[61] It is therefore natural to ask whether such a situation can
be generalized to the central-extended Galilei group, which is the relevant group in QM.
However, since the Poincare´ group does not admit nontrivial central extensions,[62] we have
to define a generalized Ino¨nu¨-Wigner contraction from a trivial extension of the Poincare´
group whose generators are H , Pi, Ji and KPi (where the last ones are the Lorentz boosts).
With this purpose, we extend the group trivially, i.e., in such a way that all the generators
of Poincare´ group commute with a trivial central charge M . The basis of the resulting
new algebra IMSO(1, 3) = ISO(1, 3)× 〈M〉 is {H , Pi, Ji, KPi , M}. Then, we perform the
following change of the generators basis H = H−M . In the new basis
{
H , Pi, Ji, KPi, M
}
all the commutators of the Poincare´ group remain the same, with the only exception of
[
Pi, KPj
]
= −iδijH = −iδij(H +M) (12)
The contraction is determined by the rescaling transformations (in the basis
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{
H , Pi, Ji, KPi, M
}
) defined by
J ′i = Ji, P
′
i = εPi, K
′
Pi
= εKPi, H
′
= H , M ′ = ε2M (13)
The space isotropy remains unchanged by this rescaling transformation and
[
P ′i , K
′
Pj
]
= −iδij(ε
2H
′
+M ′) so lim
ε→0
[
P ′i , K
′
Pj
]
= −iδijM
′ (14)
Therefore, it turns out to be clear that the contracted algebra is isomorphic to the extension
of the Galilei algebra. On the basis of this result, we have also proved that the Casimir op-
erators of the trivially extended Poincare´ group contract naturally to the Casimir operators
of the extended Galilei group.[60]
Summing up, when AR is expressed in its explicit Galilei-invariant form AR’, it leads
to a physically reasonable result: the actual-valued observables are those represented by
the Casimir operators of the mass central-extended Galilei group. The natural strategy
is to extrapolate the interpretation to the relativistic realm by replacing the Galilei group
with the Poincare´ group. But when one takes into account that the relevant group of non-
relativistic QM is not the Galilei group but its central extension, the mere replacement of
the relevant group is not sufficient: one has to show also that the actual-valued observables
in the relativistic and the non-relativistic cases are related through the adequate limit. As
a consequence, the Poincare´ group has to be trivially extended, in order to show that the
limit between the corresponding Casimir operators holds, and this result counts in favor of
the proposed extrapolation of our MHI to non-relativistic QM. Furthermore, this result is
physically reasonable because mass and spin are properties supposed to be always possessed
by any elemental particle,[63] and they are two of the properties that contribute to the
classification of elemental particles. At present we are working on a further extrapolation of
the MHI to the standard model.
IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL PICTURE OF THE QUANTUM WORLD
In general, the discussions about modal interpretations are concerned with the traditional
problems, as the measurement problem and the no-go theorems. But these are not the only
relevant issues: one should not forget the ontological question about the structure of the
world referred to by QM.
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All modal interpretations rely on a common assumption: QM does not describe what is
the case, but rather what may be the case. The problem of the nature of possibility is as old
as philosophy itself. Since Aristotle’s time to nowadays, however, two general conceptions
can be identified. On the one hand, actualism reduces possibility to actuality. This was the
position of Diodorus Cronus, who defined “the possible as that which either is or will be”. [64]
This view survived up to 20th century; for instance, for Russell ‘possible’ means ‘sometimes’,
whereas ‘necessary’ means ‘always’.[65] On the other hand, possibilism conceives possibility
as an ontologically irreducible feature of reality. From this perspective, the stoic Crissipus
defined possible as “that which is not prevented by anything from happening even if it does
not happen”.[66] In present day metaphysics, the debate actualism-possibilism is still alive.
For the actualists, the adjective ‘actual’ is redundant: non-actual possible items (objects,
properties, facts, etc.) do not exist. According to the possibilists, on the contrary, not every
possible item is an actual item: possible items—possibilia—constitute a basic ontological
category.[67]
For our MHI, probabilities measure ontological propensities, which embody a possibilist,
non-actualist possibility: a possible fact does not need to become actual to be real. This
possibility is defined by the postulates of QM and is not reducible to actuality. This means
that reality spreads out in two realms, the realm of possibility and the realm of actuality. In
Aristotelian terms, being can be said in different ways: as possible being or as actual being,
and none of them is reducible to the other. Moreover, the ontological structure of the realm of
possibility is embodied in the definition of the elemental quantum system S : (O , H), with
its initial state ρ0: (i) the space of observables O identifies all the possible type-properties
(observables) with their corresponding possible case-properties (eigenvalues), and (ii) the
initial state ρ0 codifies the measures of the propensities to actualization of all the possible
case-properties at the initial time, propensities that evolve deterministically according to
the Schro¨dinger equation.
The fact that propensities belong to the realm of possibility does not mean that they
do not have physical consequences in the realm of actuality. On the contrary, propensities
produce definite effects on actual reality even if they never become actual. An interest-
ing manifestation of such effectiveness is the case of the so-called “non-interacting experi-
ments”,[68],[69] where non-actualized possibilities can be used in practice, for instance, to
test bombs without exploding them.[70] This shows that possibility is a way in which reality
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manifests itself, a way independent of and not less real than actuality.
One of the main areas of controversy in contemporary metaphysics is the problem of the
nature of individual objects: is an individual a substratum supporting properties or a mere
“bundle” of properties?[71] The idea of a substratum acting as a bearer of properties has
pervaded the history of philosophy: it is present under different forms in Aristotle’s “primary
substance”, in Locke’s doctrine of “substance in general” or in Leibniz’s monads. Neverthe-
less, many philosophers belonging to the empiricist tradition, from Hume to Russell, Ayer
and Goodman, have considered the posit of a characterless substratum as a metaphysical
abuse. As a consequence, they adopted some version of the bundle theory, according to
which an individual is nothing but a bundle of properties: properties have metaphysical
priority over individuals and, therefore, they are the fundamental items of the ontology.
In the Hilbert space formalism, states have logical priority over observables since observ-
ables apply to states. This logical priority favors the picture of an ontology of substances
and properties, with the traditional priority of substances over properties. Our MHI, on
the contrary, is based on the algebraic formalism, where the basic elements are observables
and states are functionals over the space of observables. Then, the MHI favors the bundle
theory, that is, an ontology of properties, where the category of substance is absent.
According to the traditional versions of the bundle theory, an individual is the con-
vergence of certain case-properties, under the assumption that all the type-properties are
determined in the actual realm. For instance, a particular billiard ball is the convergence of
a definite value of position, a definite shape, say round, a definite color, say white, etc. Then,
the properties taken into account are always actual properties: bundle theories identify in-
dividuals with bundles of actual properties. In QM, on the contrary, the Kochen-Specker
theorem prevents the assignment of case-properties (eigenvalues) to all the type-properties
(observables) of the system in a non-contradictory manner. Therefore, the classical idea of
a bundle of actual properties does not work for the quantum ontology.
If, from the perspective of the MHI, the quantum world unfolds into two irreducible
realms, the realm of possibility has to be taken into account when deciding what kind of
properties constitutes the quantum bundle. Since the quantum system is identified by its
space of observables, which represent possible properties, an individual quantum system
turns out to be a bundle of possible properties : it inhabits the realm of possibility, which is
as real as the realm of actuality.
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This interpretation of quantum individual systems has the advantage of being immune
to the challenge represented by the Kochen-Specker theorem, since this theorem imposes no
restriction on possibilities. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that this conception of
individual supplies the basis for solving the problem of the indistinguishability of “identical
particles”,[72] introduced in the formalism as an ad hoc restriction on the set of states. At
present, we are working on this problem: if the traditional assumption of substantial objects,
which preserve their individuality when considered in collections, is the main obstacle to
explain quantum statistics, the conception of the quantum system as a bundle of possible
properties seems to offer a promising starting point in the search for a solution of the
problem.
Summing up, from our interpretational perspective, the talk of individual entities as
electrons or photons and their interactions can be retained only in a metaphorical sense. In
fact, in the quantum framework even the number of particles is represented by an observable
N , which is subject to the same theoretical constraints as any other observable of the
system; this leads, specially in quantum field theory, to the possibility of states that are
superpositions of different particle numbers.[73] Therefore, the number of particles N has
an actual definite value only in some cases, but it is indefinite in others. This fact, puzzling
from an ontology populated by substantial objects, is deprived of mystery when viewed
from our ontological perspective. The quantum system is not a substantial individual, but
a bundle of possible properties. The particle picture, with a definite number of particles,
is only a contextual picture valid exclusively when the observable N is picked out by the
preferred context. In this case, we could metaphorically retain the idea of a composite
system composed of individual particles that interact to each other. But in the remaining
cases, this idea proves to be completely inadequate, even in a metaphorical sense.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We hope that this journey through the main contributions of Castagnino in the field
of the foundations of QM supplies an idea of the active work that he and his research
group are developing. Nevertheless, we do not want to finish this review without recalling
the rest of the areas of the philosophy of physics where he has fruitfully produced: time’s
arrow,[74]−[81] time-asymmetric QM,[82],[83] quantum chaos,[84],[85] and even philosophy
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of chemistry.[87] Not bad for a baby philosopher. However, this is not surprising when
coming from an even-eager spirit as Mario Castagnino.
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